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Abstract
For most poor countries of today, investing in agriculture and the associated sectoral linkages 
is the most promising strategy for sustained growth and poverty reduction. Yet, in these 
countries, investment in agriculture has generally been lagging relative to international 
norms and recommendations. We start from the premise that this has been due to lack of 
success in modernizing the operations of smallholder farmers (SHF) that typically constitute 
the core of the farm population. These farmers are linked to consumers through value chains 
that range from the most elementary (local spot markets) to the most advanced (contract 
farming and out-grower schemes). Current wisdom with cases of successful modernization 
of smallholder farming is that it requires asset building, productivity growth in staple foods 
(Green Revolution), agricultural transformation (diversification of farming systems toward 
high value crops), and rural transformation (value addition through rural non-farm activities 
linked to agriculture). … /…
Key words: Constraints removal approach: constraints to modernization originating in credit, insurance, information, and 
access to deep markets. Inclusive value chain development approach: incentives to modernize originating in access to 
assets, contracts, producer organizations discipline, and value chain coordination.
 Elisabeth Sadoulet, Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, UC 
Berkeley; Senior Fellow, FERDI
 Alain de Janvry, Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Public 
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Abstract 
For most poor countries of today, investing in agriculture and the associated sectoral linkages is 
the most promising strategy for sustained growth and poverty reduction. Yet, in these countries, 
investment in agriculture has generally been lagging relative to international norms and 
recommendations. We start from the premise that this has been due to lack of success in 
modernizing the operations of smallholder farmers (SHF) that typically constitute the core of the 
farm population. These farmers are linked to consumers through value chains that range from the 
most elementary (local spot markets) to the most advanced (contract farming and out-grower 
schemes). Current wisdom with cases of successful modernization of smallholder farming is that 
it requires asset building, productivity growth in staple foods (Green Revolution), agricultural 
transformation (diversification of farming systems toward high value crops), and rural 
transformation (value addition through rural non-farm activities linked to agriculture). This 
modernization has too often been hampered by extensive market and government failures. We 
outline a theory of change where the removal of market and government failures to achieve 
modernization can be approached through two contrasted and complementary initiatives. One is 
a “constraint removal” approach where development agents (governments, international and 
bilateral development agencies, NGOs, donors) facilitate overcoming the major constraints to 
adoption: liquidity, risk, information, and access to markets. The other is an “inclusive value 
chain development” approach where agents in value chains (entrepreneurs, coordinating 
agencies, producer organizations) create incentives to smallholder modernization through 
contracting and vertical coordination. We review the extensive literature that has explored ways 
of inducing modernization through these two approaches, noting a number of success stories, and 
propose a research agenda to further explore and enhance their potential. 
Key words: Constraints removal approach: constraints to modernization originating in credit, 
insurance, information, and access to deep markets. Inclusive value chain development approach: 
incentives to modernize originating in access to assets, contracts, producer organizations 
discipline, and value chain coordination. 
1. Motivation: Role of agriculture for development
Successful productivity growth in agriculture has been the source of early development and 
subsequent structural transformation and industrialization in most of today’s developed 
countries. This has been amply documented by the work of historians such as Bairoch (1973) 
who looked at the Western industrialization experience, cascading from England in the mid-
1700s, to France and Germany around 1820, the United States and Russia in the mid-1800s, and 
finally Japan with restauration of the Meiji emperors in 1880. Following WWII, agriculture has 
similarly been the engine of growth and transformation for the Asian industrialization miracles in 
Taiwan, South Korea, China , and Vietnam (Mellor, 1995). In all these countries, an agricultural 
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revolution preceded a subsequent industrial take-off, typically by something like a half century. 
Agriculture has also fulfilled an important role in facilitating industrialization in India, Brazil, 
and Chile (Mellor, 1995; Bustos et al., 2016).  
Agriculture remains today the expected engine of growth for the “agriculture-based countries”, 
those countries with a high contribution of agriculture to GDP growth and a high share of their 
poor in the rural sector (World Bank, 2007). These are also countries where the farm population 
is importantly composed of smallholder farmers (SHF), sometimes exclusively (e.g., Malawi, 
Rwanda) and sometimes coexisting with larger commercial farms (e.g., Senegal, Mozambique). 
In both cases, agricultural growth importantly requires modernization of the operation of SHFs, 
with gains in land, labor, and total factor productivity. With labor-intensive industrialization 
increasingly compromised by robotization and the re-shoring of industries toward the 
industrialized countries (Rodrik, 2015), agriculture with agroindustry and the associated linkages 
to services and non-tradable consumption goods remains the best bet as a path toward 
industrialization for these countries. This includes most of the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
countries. A growth strategy with a prominent role for agriculture has been advocated by Stiglitz 
(2018) and Page (2018) as a major departure from the classical structural transformation 
approach based on labor-intensive industrialization advocated for example by Lin and Chang 
(2009).  
The World Development Report Agriculture for Development’s (World Bank, 2007) main 
message was that SSA countries should invest more in agriculture in order to fully capture its 
potential for growth and poverty reduction. Following the world food crisis of 2008, there was a 
short-term positive response by governments, international organizations, and the donor 
community with a sharp increase in investment in agriculture. The number of countries meeting 
the CAADEP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program) goal endorsed by 
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) of allocating at least 10% of government 
expenditures to agriculture increased from 3 in 2007 to 10 in 2009. Overseas development 
assistance to agriculture increased by 60% between 2007 and 2009. But this response was not 
sustained. In 2014 (latest data) only 2 SSA countries (Malawi and Mozambique) out of 43 met 
the CAADEP goal. The modal SSA country spends only 5% of its public expenditures on 
agriculture. No SSA country spends a percentage of its public budget on agriculture that reaches 
the percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP, and 75% of the countries spend less than half 
that percentage (Goyal and Nash, 2016). NEPAD also set a goal for public spending on 
agricultural Research-and-Development to reach 1% of agricultural GDP. Returns to investing in 
agricultural research are typically significantly in excess of cost relative to other public 
programs, indicating under-investment (Alston et al., 2009). This takes extreme forms in SSA 
where investment is by far the lowest among regions and has been declining over the last decade. 
In 2011, only six countries (Swaziland, Cabo Verde, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and 
Mauritius) met the NEPAD research goal (IFPRI, 2018). With failure to invest in agriculture, the 
yield gap on cereals has continued to increase between SSA and other regions of the world. This 
gap is correlated with a growing chemical fertilizer gap and a large deficit in irrigation. Today, 
the World Development Report’s main message continues to be advocated by international 
development organizations such as the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Goyal and Nash, 2016; IFAD, 2016). This 
is motivated by the observation that 51% of the world extreme poor live in SSA, a share that 
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continues to rise, and 78% of the world extreme poor work in agriculture in spite of rapid 
urbanization.  
 
In the current global economic context for the SSA countries, investing in agriculture where the 
poor work has proven more effective for poverty reduction than taking the poor out of 
agriculture and to an urban-industrial environment, i.e., through a Lewis (1954)-type structural 
transformation. Research shows that the poor are not found in agriculture due to adverse 
selection. Poverty reduction, where it has happened, has been more effective through 
productivity growth where the poor work (in agriculture and rural areas) than through structural 
transformation (Christiaensen and Todo, 2014; Rodrik et al., 2016). A Solow-type 
decomposition of sources of growth shows that agricultural output growth in SSA in the 1985-
2012 period originated for 63% from area expansion compared to 8% from factor deepening and 
29% from productivity growth (Goyal and Nash, 2016). This is not sustainable due to an 
effective land constraint and declining farm size in most countries as a consequence of rapid 
population growth. Take Malawi as an example where agricultural land for households engaged 
in agricultural production fell from 2.3 acres in 2004, to 1.8 in 2010, and 1.4 in 2016 (de Janvry, 
Duquennois, and Sadoulet, 2018). Productivity growth and factor deepening consequently have 
to be the main sources of growth in Sub-Saharan agriculture as in the rest of the developing 
world where they account for 83% of agricultural output growth. 
 
This opinion on the role of agriculture for development is far from universally shared in the 
development community. Gollin et al. (2014) and Collier and Dercon (2015) have argued that 
rural poverty reduction has to come from employment creation in the urban-industrial 
environment and a corresponding structural transformation of the economy. As seen above, 
governments have correspondingly not invested public resources in agriculture to the 
recommended levels. Hence the puzzle in using agriculture for development is: why has the 
World Development Report/CAADEP recommendation not been followed?  
 
There are African countries to look at for successful progress toward a Green Revolution 
(Ethiopia in maize for the domestic market) and a rural transformation (Morocco exports of high 
value horticultural products and fruit to Europe; Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire cocoa exports; 
Ethiopia exports of sesame and cut flowers) (Boettiger et al., 2017). Chemical fertilizer use is 
overall low (16 kg per ha of arable land vs. 158 in South Asia and 344 in East Asia and the 
Pacific), but uneven across countries. The LSMS-ISA data show that the share of cultivating 
households using chemical fertilizer reaches 77% in Malawi, 56% in Ethiopia, and 41% in 
Nigeria, while remaining at 17% in Niger and Tanzania, and 3% in Uganda (Christiaensen, 
2017). Rural transformation is accompanied by land concentration in medium farms (5 to 100 
hectares) in countries like Kenya (where they control 20% of total farm land), Ghana (32%), 
Tanzania (39%), and Zambia (50%) (Jayne et al., 2018). These farms are typically mechanized 
and owned by well-educated urban-based professionals who can be effective agents for 
technology adoption. These various success stories show that using agriculture for development 
can be done, but has not yet been sufficient to overcome continuing rising gaps between SSA 
and the rest of the world. 
 
2. Re-interpreting the role of agriculture for development 
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While there has been limited success with enhancing public expenditures in agriculture, there has 
been considerable progress with data collection and with rigorous experimentation on how to 
promote the modernization of agriculture. We know more today about how to use agriculture for 
development than we did 10 years ago, even though this knowledge has not been put into 
practice in the desirable form and to the desirable degree. It is consequently important to start by 
reviewing what we have learned. 
 
The main argument that has been used in support of the need for a structural transformation as 
the mechanism to reduce poverty is that there is a large labor productivity gap between 
agriculture and non-agriculture (Gollin et al., 2014). An important observation, however, based 
on the LSMS-ISA data for SSA is that while the gap in labor productivity per person per year 
between non-agriculture and agriculture is indeed large, the gap in labor productivity per hour 
worked between non-agriculture and agriculture is relatively small (McCullough, 2017). In other 
words, when agricultural workers do work, their labor productivity is not very different from that 
of non-agricultural households. What this suggests is that there is a deficit in work opportunities 
for agricultural vs. non-agricultural workers that creates an income gap between the two 
categories of workers. 
 
Because households engage in a multiplicity of sectoral activities, the relevant contrast in labor 
productivity is not between agriculture and non-agriculture, but between rural and urban 
households, with rural households typically principally engaged in agriculture. Looking at labor 
calendars for rural and urban households in Malawi in Figure 1, we see that weekly household 
hours worked are not different for rural and urban households at peak labor time, which 
corresponds to the planting season in December and January (de Janvry, Duquennois, and 
Sadoulet, 2018). During the rest of the year, there are much less employment opportunities for 
rural than urban households, with the former working about half the time worked by urban 
households during the low season (June and July). Lack of labor smoothing across months can 
thus be a major cause of income differentials between rural and urban households. Measuring 
annual labor productivity as median household real consumption per capita, rural households are 
at 57% of individuals in urban households. When this is measured not per year but per hour 
worked, rural households are at 81% of individuals in urban households.  
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Figure 1. Urban and rural household labor calendars in Malawi 
Source: de Janvry, Duquennois, and Sadoulet, 2018 
 
With high urban unemployment in Malawi limiting the option of reducing rural poverty through 
permanent or seasonal rural-urban migration, this suggests that a key instrument for rural poverty 
reduction is to have less idle time for land and labor throughout the monthly calendar. For 
Bangladesh, Lagakos et al. (2018) proposed filling labor calendar for rural households through 
migration to cities during the lean season. When this option is not available due to high urban 
unemployment--in addition to seasonal migration being potentially detrimental to agricultural 
practices in the home plot (Fink et al., 2014)--filling and smoothing labor calendars in rural areas 
becomes a key dimension of poverty reduction. This can involve both employment in agriculture 
with more diversified farming systems and in the local rural non-farm economy. This is the 
purpose of the agricultural and rural transformations that are also important in redefining the role 
of agriculture for development. 
 
Based on work done for the IFAD (2016) Rural Development Report led by Binswanger, for 
China by Huang (2016), by BRAC on graduating the ultra-poor out of poverty (Banerjee et al., 
2015), for the Gates Foundation by Boettiger et al. (2017), and for the ATAI project (ATAI, 
2018), a strategy out of rural poverty would involve the following five steps: Asset building, 
Green Revolution, Agricultural Transformation, Rural Transformation, and Structural 
Transformation as described in Table 1. We refer to this theory as the agriculture for 
development sequence. 
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Table 1. The agriculture modernization sequence 
 
Minimum asset endowments for SHF under the form of land, capital, health, knowledge and 
skills, and social capital are needed to initiate production for the market and participation in a 
value chain. This corresponds to minimum capital endowments to get started in production in 
farm household models such as Eswaran and Kotwal’s (1986), and to asset thresholds to escape 
poverty traps in Barrett and Carter (2012). The BRAC graduation model for the rural ultra-poor 
thus importantly starts with achieving minimum asset thresholds for households to engage in 
self-employment in agriculture (Banerjee et al., 2015), with rigorous impact evaluations 
demonstrating success in raising household consumption in five of six case countries. Evaluation 
with a randomized experiment of a BRAC credit program for landless workers and SHF in 
Bangladesh shows that loans can be used to rent land and to select more favorable fixed rent over 
sharecropping contracts (Das et al., 2019). 
 
The Green Revolution, whereby productivity growth is achieved in staple crops through the 
adoption and diffusion of high yielding variety seeds and fertilizers is the initial step in 
agricultural modernization. It has been actively pursued to achieve food security and is a learning 
ground for the subsequent transformations of agriculture and rural areas. It has been a major 
success of the Consultative Group in International Agricultural Research and is still an ongoing 
effort in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern India. 
 
A key objective of the Agricultural Transformation is to fill labor calendars over as much of the 
year as possible through multiple cropping (diversification in agriculture)--which typically 
requires water control to cultivate land in the dry season--, the development of value chains for 
new crops, and contracting among agents in these value chains. An example is the introduction 
of short duration rice varieties in Bangladesh that frees the land for an additional crop, typically 
high value products such as potatoes and onions, between rainy season and dry season rice crops. 
This makes an important contribution to filling land and labor calendars and to reducing the 
length of the hungry season. Necessary for this third crop is water control so cultivation can 
happen beyond reliance on the monsoon and risk is reduced for costly investments (Emerick et 
al., 2017). Because the Agricultural Transformation implies diversification of farming system, it 
is a key element of national food security strategies where diverse diets, including perishable 
Stages of transformation Processes
Asset building Access to land and human capital for the 
landless and SHF
Green Revolution Adoption/diffusion of new seeds and fertilizers
for staple crops
Agricultural Transformation Access to water for irrigation
Ag diversification toward high value crops
Development of value chains and contracting
Rural Transformation Mechanization and land concentration
Development of land and labor markets
Growth of the rural non-farm economy
Structural Transformation Rural-urban migration
Urban-based industrialization and services
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goods that are less traded than staple foods, are an important element of a solution (Dewey, 
2017). 
 
SHFs are engaged in value chains that define the way they relate to markets. Value chains for 
agricultural products link farmers backward to their input and technology suppliers and forward 
to intermediaries, processors, and ultimately consumers (Reardon et al., 2009; Swinnen et al., 
2015). Relations within value chains often take the form of contractual arrangements. Induced by 
income gains for consumers, urbanization, and globalization, there has been in recent years a 
rapid development of value chains not only for low-value staple food crops, but also for medium-
value traditional domestic consumption and export crops, and high-value non-traditional export 
crops. Their structure can take a wide variety of forms in linking SHF to consumers, ranging 
from the more traditional to the more elaborate (Byerlee and Haggblade, 2013) as follows: 
 
• Spot markets: individual SHF buy inputs from agro-dealers and technology companies 
and sell products to local traders (coaxers) who in turn sell to long-distance traders, 
wholesalers, retailers, and ultimately consumers. This applies mainly to low value staple 
food crops for the domestic market (Lançon, 2018). 
• Collective action for marketing: SHF buy inputs and sell products through producer 
organizations and marketing cooperatives.  
• Contract farming with individual SHF or with producer organizations (so-called 
“productive alliances”, see World Bank, 2016): contracts are typically resource-
providing, potentially including credit, insurance, access to inputs, and technical 
assistance, at the same time as they may specify quality of deliveries and offer price 
guarantees. 
• Out-grower schemes with plantations or estates: SHF are contracted to deliver to the 
nucleus institution (a plantation, an agroindustry), typically also through resource 
providing contacts (Casaburi and Willis, 2018). 
• Vertically integrated commercial farms where SHF participate to value sharing through 
the labor market as workers on the commercial farms (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). 
 
A key objective of the Rural Transformation is to give access to smallholder households to 
sources of income beyond agriculture, contributing to the diversification of sources of income in 
what has often been referred to in rural sociology as “pluriactivity”. In Ghana, income derived 
from the rural non-farm economy (including seasonal migration) for rural households is about 
40% of total income, a share that increases as land endowments fall (World Bank, 2007). It is 
indeed the case that, with land limitations, smallholder households rarely exit poverty with 
agriculture alone. This requires the development of land markets (to allow for gradual land 
consolidation and mechanization) and of labor markets (with different members of the household 
usually specializing in farm or non-farm activities rather than switching activities over the labor 
calendar; see de Janvry, Duquennois, and Sadoulet, 2018, for Malawi). This process will happen 
in the more favorable areas where a rural non-farm economy linked to agriculture can develop 
through forward, backward, and final demand linkages. This is the Agriculture Demand-Led 
Industrialization strategy advocated by Adelman (1984) and Mellor (1995) that is actively 
pursued in countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, and through CAADP in much of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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3. How to promote the modernization of SHF agriculture? 
 
In vast regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the desirable modernization of SHF has 
been held back by multiple obstacles that are presumed to originate in market and government 
failures (World Bank, 2007; Goyal and Nash, 2018). These failures may result in (1) lack of 
profitability of innovations for particular SHFs given their specific circumstances, (2) lack of 
local availability of the innovations in spite of potential profitability, and (3) constraints to 
adoption in spite of potential profitability and availability. These constraints concern most 
particularly lack of access to sources of liquidity such as credit and savings, risk and lack of 
access to risk-reducing instruments such as insurance and emergency credit lines, lack of access 
to information about the existence of new technology and how to use it, and lack of access to 
input and output markets due to high transaction costs such as poor infrastructure and monopoly 
power in markets. The modernization problem is thus particularly multidimensional and difficult 
to solve.  
 
There are basically two contrasted approaches to potentially overcoming the problems that 
obstruct SHF modernization. The first consists in focusing on particular groups of farmers and 
addressing each of the problems in their own shapes and forms that affect them in modernizing. 
We can label this a “push-driven” approach to modernization and transformations. It consists in 
securing the existence and profitability of innovations, ensuring their local availability, and then 
overcoming each of the four major constraints to demand and adoption through either better 
technology or through institutional innovations (Magruder, 2018; Bridle et al., 2018). The second 
consists in creating incentives for SHF to modernize by building value chains for the particular 
product, and managing vertical (contracts, stakeholder dialogue) and horizontal (producer 
organizations) coordination within the value chains to overcome the profitability-availability-
constraints obstacles as they apply to inclusion and competitiveness of SHF in the value chain. 
This is a “pull-driven” approach to modernization and transformations. It consists in creating the 
demand for innovations in order to establish SHF competitiveness within a value chain, and then 
securing the existence, availability, and conditions for adoption of innovations. The approach 
thus requires both value chain development and value chain inclusion of SHFs.  
 
The theory of change we use in this paper is represented in Figure 2. Circumstances for SHF 
modernization include the national and international context and policies, deficits in access to 
assets, and market and government failures that affect them. Approaches to modernization can 
follow a push or a pull approach, in each case with specific agents engaging in the push or pull 
activities. Desired outcomes are adoption/modernization, productivity growth in staple foods, 
Agricultural and Rural Transformations, and growth and poverty reduction. In what follows, we 
review each of these approaches in turn. Both have been extensively used and analyzed, yet 
belong to somewhat separate traditions in spite of obvious complementarity. 
 
Ferdi WP n°253 / de Janvry A., Sadoulet E. >> Transforming developing country agriculture …
 9 
 
 
Figure 2. Theory of change for SHF modernization: Constraint removal and inclusive 
value chain development 
 
4. Lessons from studies addressing constraints to adoption 
 
Technological innovation are first analyzed in experimental plots, usually for yield and resilience 
to specific shocks. But this does not tell us whether the innovation is likely to be adopted by 
SHF. Analysis of the modernization problem should start with verification that the innovation is 
indeed profitable for the intended SHF under their own objectives, capacities, and circumstances. 
Measuring profitability in farmers’ plots is however very difficult, if not outright impossible 
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). There are data problems in observing family labor time and 
definitional problems in setting the opportunity cost for family labor and self-provided inputs. 
Conditions also vary year-to-year due to weather conditions, with only short time series to 
observe how climate affects outcomes, made even more difficult to interpret with climate 
change. And there are many unobservable conditions and complementary factors that affect 
profitability and compromise the external validity of any measurement made at a particular time 
and place. An alternative approach is to verify profitability without measuring it. Some among 
the best endowed and best located farmers have to be able to make sustained use of the 
innovation for the innovation to have adoption potential by others under current (or modifiable) 
market, policy, and complementary input conditions. This can be established by observation, 
experimentation, or simulation.  
 
Once the innovation is proven profitable and locally available, its adoption may still be 
hampered by constraints facing SHF in accessing liquidity, risk-reducing instruments, 
information, and markets. These four categories of constraints have been extensively analyzed 
using in particular randomized control trials to identify their causal relations to adoption (ATAI, 
2018). These studies typically seek to identify ways of overcoming these constraints that could 
be implemented by governments, international organizations, NGOs, and benevolent actors such 
as foundations and corporate social responsibility initiatives.  
 
a. Credit and savings 
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Due to seasonality, especially under rainfed farming conditions which is where most of the lag in 
modernization currently prevails (i.e., in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern South Asia), 
there is a lack of correspondence between the timing of agricultural incomes and expenditures. 
As a consequence, the inter-temporal displacement of liquidity through credit and savings is 
important for farmers to invest in new technologies, purchase inputs, optimize the timing of 
sales, buy consumption goods, and cover timely expenditures such as school fees.  
 
Yet, financial services for SHFs appear too frequently to be ill-designed for their purpose, 
expensive, excessively risky, and not easily available. Even when they have formal land titles, 
SHF are typically unwilling to put their land at risk as collateral with a commercial bank, thus 
acting as “risk constrained” (Boucher et al., 2008). Microfinance products that effectively 
circumvent the collateral problem by relying on group lending and joint liability tend to be too 
expensive for the long agricultural cycles (e.g., 24% interest on BRAC and Grameen Bank loans 
with 7% inflation in Bangladesh) and have repayment conditions that are typically ill adapted to 
the timing of the capacity of farmers to pay (Burke et al., 2019). Availability of credit from 
formal sources, both commercial and non-profit, is consequently limited, and SHF must either 
self-finance or rely on informal lenders with prohibitive interest rates. Hence, there would appear 
to exist a largely unresolved liquidity constraint on adoption originating on the supply side of the 
financial market. 
 
Recent field experiments are providing evaluations of different interventions aiming at relaxing 
the liquidity constraint on SHF, with fertilizer the most commonly used indicator of technology 
adoption because of its ubiquitous recognition and yet massive underuse. While contexts and 
interventions vary for these experiments, they surprisingly tend to show that a liquidity constraint 
is not the main reason why SHF are under-investing in fertilizers. The main constraint is instead 
lack of profitability in adopting fertilizers. 
 
A first category of experiments consists in providing unrestricted access to credit to a defined 
eligible population, as in Morocco (Crépon et al., 2015), Mali (Beaman et al., 2015), and 
Ethiopia (Tarozzi et al., 2013).  While interest rates in these studies were variously subsidized 
(they were set at 12.5-14.5%, 25%, and 12%, respectively), uptake remained low: only 17% of 
eligible farmers took a loan in Morocco, 21% in Mali, and 36% in Ethiopia. Furthermore, 
farmers that did take a loan only used a small fraction of the liquidity to increase their 
expenditures on fertilizer or other agricultural inputs (e.g., input expenditures increased by 11% 
in Mali, relative to farmers in the control group that were not offered credit).  
 
Other experiments offered restricted credit that can only be used on agricultural inputs. Such 
credit displaces the equilibrium allocation of liquidity in favor of the targeted inputs, similarly to 
what a price discount would do.  And yet, uptake remained low. In Malawi input credit (at 27.5% 
interest rate for 10 months) for high-yielding maize and groundnuts was taken by 33% of the 
farmers (Giné and Yang, 2009).  
 
This low demand for credit seems to be reflective of a low demand for the inputs themselves.  
The low demand for fertilizer is exemplified in two rather extreme experiments. In Mali, Beaman 
et al. (2015) provided to another group of farmers a pure cash grant, rather than the credit 
described above.  This only raised the expenses on fertilizer by 15%, in comparison with 11% 
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with a credit that had to be paid for, showing that credit is not the major constraint to adoption.  
In Mozambique, a group of progressive and well positioned farmers, with good access to 
extension services and to input and output markets, were offered vouchers with a 75% discount 
on fertilizer price, and yet only 28% of the farmers redeemed their vouchers (Carter et al., 2013).  
 
There are a few experiments that show the importance of well-tailored credit and savings 
products to support the adoption of profitable innovations by SHF.  Two cases exhibit the 
importance of accounting for the seasonal distribution of farmer income. In Kenya, One Acre 
Fund offered harvest-time loan at 10% interest rate with repayment expected 9 months after 
harvest, collateralized with stored maize. The objective was to allow farmers to avoid selling 
their harvest at the time of the year where prices are lowest, postponing sale to the period of high 
prices.  63% of the eligible farmers took the loan. A similar savings scheme through group-based 
grain storage was introduced in Kenya.  Fifty eight percent of the farmers took-up the product, 
and were twice as likely to sell maize on the market (Aggarwal, Francis, and Robinson, 2018). 
While these financial products contribute to the households’ welfare, and indirectly increase the 
return to agricultural production, there is no evidence that they induced higher adoption of 
fertilizer or other modern technologies.  Another interesting experiment for large equipment is to 
have them self-collateralizing the loan.  This is feasible when the equipment requires a large 
initial investment but retains its value over the loan period.  An example is water tanks provided 
on leasing arrangement (at a very low real interest rate) in Kenya to small farmers by a dairy 
cooperative, with repayment of the loan deducted from milk sales (Jack, Kremer, de Laat, and 
Suri, 2016). This scheme increased the take-up of water tank from 2.4% to 41.9%, and most 
loans were fully paid in advance of the planned 24 months.   
 
These experiments point to the existence of other constraints to fertilizer use. This can be lack of 
complementary inputs (such as organic fertilizers and soil nutrients), excessively high risk, or 
high transaction costs in reaching markets that all make fertilizer use not profitable.  These other 
constraints need to be jointly addressed with credit availability. An example is new financial 
products such as Risk Contingent Credit where repayment is insured by an index insurance, 
where insurance serves as collateral for the loan, and where the insurance premium is paid with 
loan repayment at the end of the season that have promise and are under experimentation (Shee 
et al., 2018). Another example is precision farming where soil testing allows to customize 
fertilizer recommendations to heterogenous local conditions and to design comprehensive 
technological packages (Cole and Fernando, 2016). 
 
Conclusion is thus that credit availability is not the main constraint to fertilizer use for a large 
majority of SHF in SSA and SA. For them, low fertilizer use is mainly due to low profitability 
associated with physical, market, and institutional conditions. Interventions to secure both the 
profitability of fertilizers and the availability of well-designed financial products for their 
circumstances are necessary for large scale adoption to occur.  
 
b. Risk and Insurance 
Smallholder farmers are exposed to many risks that can put their lives and assets in jeopardy and 
deter investment. Shocks include weather, plagues, prices, and health. As a consequence, SHF 
engage in shock-coping adjustments after an adverse event has occurred, and in risk-
management strategies in anticipation of shocks difficult to cope with. Both responses are costly. 
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Shock-coping includes dis-saving, emergency borrowing, sale of productive assets, emergency 
migration, use of child labor by taking children out of school, and postponement of consumption 
expenditures. Some of these responses can have long-term consequences, particularly when they 
imply decapitalization of assets, including child human capital and health (Carter and Barrett, 
2006; Maccini and Yang, 2009). SHF also engage in risk-management practices. This includes 
preferring to use low return-low risk traditional technologies, holding large precautionary 
savings (such as food grains) and productive assets that are biased toward liquidity (such as 
animals), and engaging in income diversification at an efficiency cost (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993).  
 
These costly strategies to deal with risk reduce the resources available for investment and 
technology adoption.  Risk exposure also has a direct consequence on the adoption of 
technologies in reducing their return.  Thinking of fertilizer, for example, the possibly that 
drought or flood wipes out the harvest and hence the return to fertilizer discourages its 
application in the first place (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011) 
 
The obviously missing piece in the panoply of risk management and risk coping instruments 
used by smallholder farmers is insurance.  Agricultural insurance is common in developed 
countries, although usually heavily subsidized.  For SHF in developing countries, the 
administrative and implementation costs for agricultural insurance that requires verification of 
losses by an adjustor are too high to make it cost effective.  Index insurance, where payments are 
triggered by a verifiable local index of rainfall or small area average yield has promise (Carter et 
al., 2017). Yet, take up has been very low, typically not exceeding 6 to 18% at market price 
(Schickele, 2016), with the reasons for low adoption shown to be multiple, including basis risk, 
lack of trust, liquidity constraints, and limited salience of benefits (Cole et al., 2013) 
 
The question for this paper, however, is whether insurance, when taken, induces farmers to adopt 
technology. Only a few studies in which the insurance uptake was sufficient permit this analysis. 
Experimental results for Ghana have shown that farmers that purchased insurance increased their 
use of chemical inputs by 24% (Karlan et al., 2014). Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) offering a 
(highly subsidized) insurance to farmers in India, show that it induced them to replace their use 
of traditional risk tolerant rice varieties by higher yielding varieties. Cai (2016) shows that a 
weather insurance policy in China induced tobacco farmers to increase their production of this 
risky but highly profitable crop by 16 percent and their borrowing by 29 percent.  
 
These experimental results suggests that if one could improve the design of the insurance product 
so that uptake could increase, technology adoption may follow.  Promising avenues include 
products with reduced basis risk (higher density of weather stations and better yield predictions 
using satellite imagery), financial training to help farmers better understand the insurance (Cai et 
al., 2019), group insurance on the presumption that managers have a better understanding of the 
product than farmers (McIntosh et al., 2018), and combining index insurance with other risk-
reducing instruments, including social assistance for large shocks (Carter et al., 2017). 
 
Also promising is to reduce risk through resilient technology such as drought and flood tolerant 
seed varieties. SwarnaSub1, a superior rice technology with flood resilience properties, is 
appealing to farmers in flood-prone areas. Emerick et al. (2016) show that adoption of Swarna-
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Sub1 enhances agricultural productivity by crowding in modern inputs (fertilizer) and cultivation 
practices (more labor intensive planting method), and increasing credit demand.  Finally, an 
innovative financial product introduced by BRAC in Bangladesh is contingent credit lines 
indexed on events such as flooding (Lane, 2018). This experiment shows that households given 
pre-approval to take a loan if they experienced flooding in their local area increased investment 
in risky production practices as part of their risk-management response. Since offering 
contingent credit lines has little ex-ante cost, the behavioral effect can be very large. 
 
c. Information 
A farmer’s decision to adopt a technology relies on his assessment of its value for himself. 
Hence beyond being aware of the existence (and availability if it needs to be acquired) of the 
technology, the farmer needs fairly complete information on the specificity of the technology, 
how to use it or adapt it, and how it would perform in his own context.  To take some examples, 
the adoption of a new variety or management practice requires being aware and informed on 
their characteristics, associated best practices, and benefits.  But even the adoption of fertilizers 
which are broadly familiar to most farmers, requires reliable information on their quality (Bold et 
al., 2017) and the very specific quantity and timing of application that depends on local 
conditions.  This learning process is particularly difficult due to the heterogeneity of contexts 
across farmers (notably spatial heterogeneity of soil quality) and across years (notably because of 
weather variation) (Tjernström, 2017). The traditional model of public or private sector extension 
agents faces multiple limitations.  In addition to customization of the advice that should be 
delivered, the sheer number of smallholders and their geographical dispersion limit what a public 
or private extension service can possibly achieve.  In India, for example, fewer than 6% of the 
agricultural population reports having ever received information from extension services (Cole 
and Fernando, 2016). In Uganda and Malawi, these numbers are higher (11% and 50% in one 
year, respectively) but still implying receiving a service less than once a year (Ragasa and Niu, 
2017; Kabunga et al., 2016). 
 
Given the multitude of smallholder farmers and the limited number of extension agents, 
extension services have typically focused their efforts on training “contact farmers” and 
expecting that these entry points in the farming community will circulate (push) information in 
their social networks, inducing other farmers to adopt (Anderson and Feder, 2007).  The idea is 
to reinforce the process of learning and diffusion of technology from farmers experiencing for 
themselves to watching others experience the technology (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). This 
model is extensively used in countries like Malawi and parts of Peru. Recent research has 
attempted to improve on this model by identifying optimum entry point farmers to maximize the 
subsequent diffusion of information and adoption.  The theory of social networks gives useful 
clues as to which farmers to potentially select as contact farmers based on their position in the 
network (Jackson, 2008; Beaman et al., 2018). Other less theoretically based experiments 
compare the diffusion of the technology through contact farmers identified as “peer” farmers 
(resembling most others in the community, in particular by gender), large farmers, extension 
officer-designated farmers, community-designated farmers, members of women’s groups, etc. 
(Emerick and Dar, 2019; BenYishay and Mobarak, 2019; Dar et al., 2019). Results do not 
coalesce to a general finding, suggesting that who are the best contact farmers is context specific.  
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To be good entry points, contact farmers also need to be good experimenters, demonstrating the 
benefits of the new technology.  Finding out who those good demonstrators are in not easy. An 
interesting idea is that farmers themselves have a better idea of how they will benefit from the 
new technology.  And this should be reflected in their willingness-to-pay to experiment with the 
new technology (Chassang et al., 2019).  Experimentation has shown that incentivizing lead 
farmers with the payment of bonuses proportional to their success with diffusion of the 
innovation in their community may be necessary and can be effective (BenYishay and Mobarak, 
2019). It remains however unclear whether this recommendation is scalable.  
 
In many contexts, the private profit-making sector can benefit from providing farmers with the 
essential agronomic and business knowledge needed to be more productive.1  A recent 
experiment uses this idea in selecting local agro-dealers as entry points in the diffusion process 
of a new flood tolerant variety (Emerick et al., 2018). Results are encouraging, showing that 
training agro-dealers results is wider diffusion of the new rice variety than the traditional contact 
farmer approach, and that these dealers more effectively target the new seed to places where 
flooding is more frequent and thus where it will be the most profitable. This provides evidence 
that dealers are motivated to provide farmers with the right technology and can thus be used as 
diffusion agents.   
 
Extension services can also be made more effective by using ICT technology.  Experiments 
include sending SMS reminders to farmers on agronomic practices (Casaburi et al., 2014) and 
using SMS to make recommendations customized to farmers’ own idiosyncratic soil conditions 
(Cole and Fernando, 2016). In some specific cases, there may be simple techniques that can 
substantially improve farmers’ ability to access information through self-experimentation.  An 
interesting experiment provides farmers with leaf color charts that guide them in their fertilizer 
doses decisions (Islam, 2014). 
 
The extension models described above rely on what can be called a “push approach”, whereby 
extension agents or lead farmers are expected to push the information to the farmers they are in 
contact with. There is also potential for a “pull approach” to the diffusion of information through 
social learning. In this case, information is broadly broadcasted in the community that something 
is to be learned from informed (contact) farmers. “Buzzing” can motivate farmers to seek the 
information from informed farmers that may be inside or outside their normal social networks. 
de Janvry et al. (2019) thus show that “buzzing” through visible demonstration plots that use a 
counterfactual (so-called “side-to-side” demonstration plots where the next best seed variety for 
the demonstrating farmer is cultivated next to the new technology) can be just as effective as 
seeding information through central farmers (in this case large farmers and extension officer-
selected farmers). Under this approach, farmers know that there is something to be learned and 
they know with whom to engage in conversation to be informed. Banerjee et al. (2018) found a 
                                                        
1 See Section 5 below on the value chain and contract arrangements that include these advisory services 
by large input suppliers or processors. A few large input suppliers such as Hariyali Kisaan Bazaar and 
Tata Kisan Sansar in India provide advices in their retail stores. Processors that buy their product from 
small farmers will also provide services that include agronomic training. There are examples in 
http://www.g-fras.org/en/ggp-home.html and in IFPRI’s series of Good Practice Notes related to 
extension. 
 
Ferdi WP n°253 / de Janvry A., Sadoulet E. >> Transforming developing country agriculture …
 15 
similar result in helping people understand the demonetization process in India: “seed” 
information and broadly inform who the “seeds” are so they induce information-seeking 
conversations. The advantage is lower cost (not having to identify who are the central farmers in 
each community) and ability to reach less privileged farmers who do not belong to well informed 
social networks. 
 
In general, the information issue remains poorly addressed for SHF in SSA. Extension services 
are even more under-funded than Research-and-Development and in need of new approaches 
that may work. The role of the private sector in circulating information in contexts where value 
chains are poorly developed needs to be further explored. Using IT services such as Digital 
Green and digital platforms are still in their infancy (Aker, Ghosh, and Burrell, 2016). Innovative 
approaches in addressing the information problem are in need of conceptualization and 
experimentation, with significant opportunities to make a large difference on SHF 
modernization. 
 
c. Access to markets and quality recognition 
Incentives to adoption require good access to well performing markets. In contrast, SHF 
typically face poor infrastructure and high transaction costs, limited access to information on 
prices, lack of competition on local markets, and problems with quality recognition for inputs 
and outputs.  
 
Distance to market and poor infrastructure are major contributors to higher input prices and 
lower product prices for net sellers, which in turn act as a tax that discourages the adoption of 
innovations. Aggarwal et al. (2018) thus show that distance to market is equivalent to a 6% ad-
valorem tax per kilometer for villages in Tanzania. Reducing travel cost by 50%, which is said to 
be equivalent to paving rural roads, would in this case increase local maize prices and double 
fertilizer adoption. Improved infrastructure may however increase or decrease the prices of local 
crops depending on the competitiveness of local goods with those from further away. For Sierra 
Leone, Casaburi, Glennester, and Suri (2013) show that improving rural roads lowers prices on 
rural markets, benefiting consumers and hurting producers. They find that only when cell phone 
services help reach markets further away does improved infrastructure raise local prices, 
benefiting producers.  
 
Improved price information can also have mixed effects on farmer welfare. The role of IT 
services in reducing search costs, lowering local price volatility, and raising average producer 
prices was observed by Jensen (2007) for fish in India and by Aker (2010) for grains in Niger. 
Better information on prices was also observed by Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) in Uganda 
to have a positive effect on the level of prices received by farmers. However, better price 
information may have no effect on prices received by farmers if they have no option to sell on 
these markets and no bargaining power with local merchants (Fafchamps and Minten, 2012).  
 
Local markets may also not be competitive, with the possibility of extensive collusion among 
merchants as shown by Bergquist (2017) in Kenya using an experiment exogenously varying the 
number of merchants on local markets. This finding is however not supported in an extensive 
literature review by Dillon and Dambro (2016) who found that local markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa overall tend to be competitive. 
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Finally, quality recognition is a major issue on local markets, even though consumers are willing 
to pay a price premium for higher quality, particularly for higher phytosanitary standards. 
Quality recognition via third party certification, as for onions in Senegal, resulted in higher 
prices for good quality produce and created incentives for farmers to adopt quality-enhancing 
technology (Bernard et al., 2017). On input markets, Bold et al. (2017) find that there is 
extensive cheating on the quality of fertilizers, contributing to low adoption in Uganda. An 
experiment by Hasanain, Khan, and Rezaee (2016) shows that quality recognition in services 
markets via IT ratings can lead to improved veterinary services for artificial insemination in 
Pakistan. This was due to increased veterinarian effort once success rates were known to cattle 
owners.  
 
The frequent poor performance of markets due to high transaction costs, partial transmission of 
information, frequent lack of competitiveness, and lack of quality recognition remains a major 
obstacle to profitability and hence to technological upgrading. Addressing these constraints 
requires not only institutional innovations, but also costly public investments in infrastructure 
and marketing facilities. 
 
d. A ceiling to adoption 
The constraint removal approach has helped identify potential technological and institutional 
innovations to enhance adoption. In spite of this, technology adoption and modernization has 
been modest. As shown by continuously rising yield gaps, and in spite of many local success 
stories, a global Green Revolution for Africa is still in the waiting. A major difficulty for 
technology adoption under rainfed conditions is heterogeneity of conditions. At the household 
level, this applies to three dimensions: farmer circumstances, farmer objectives, and farmer 
capacity. If these dimensions are immutable or too costly to change, technological innovations 
must be customized to fit these dimensions. 
 
Farmers’ circumstances such as agro-ecological conditions vary widely over short distances and 
across years in particular regarding rainfall patterns and soil fertility (soil acidity, organic 
matter). For Zambia, Burke et al. (2017) show that only 8% of farmers can benefit from basal 
chemical fertilizer applications due to lack of a complementary factor, in this case lime to 
achieve the desirable level of soil acidity. In Western Kenya, Marenya and Barrett (2009) find 
that only 55% of plots can use chemical fertilizers profitably due to lack of a complementary 
factor, in this case soil organic matter as measured by carbon content. Barghava et al. (2018) 
similarly find that there is complementarity between soil organic carbon and modern inputs. For 
adoption to go beyond farmers with complementary factors in place, technological innovations 
must either be customized to fit heterogeneous contextual conditions, or complementary factors 
must be delivered jointly with the technological innovation. 
 
Farmers’ objectives are different from breeders’ who typically focus on maximum yields in 
experimental plots with highly favorable controlled conditions (Laajaj et al., 2018). Farmers 
maximize profit or utility weighting return and risk. They may also have labor calendar 
objectives such as labor-saving at peak periods and labor-smoothing in the rest of the year. Labor 
constraints on farming may come from involvement in rural non-farm economy activities and 
seasonal migration, requiring to fit farming systems to accommodate complementarities between 
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on- and off-farm labor engagements, including a gender division of tasks. The household will 
have nutritional objectives if part of the harvest is home consumed, and diversity of diets matter 
for the choice of farming systems. These specific objectives must feed into the design of new 
customized technological innovations. 
 
Farmers’ capacity may be improved through the acquisition of information and skills, but other 
dimensions of capacity are fixed factors to which technological innovations must adapt. T.W. 
Schultz (1964) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) have famously shown that farmers’ education 
matters for technology adoption. Low skills may reduce the capacity and the speed of learning 
(Laajaj et al., 2018). Again, limits on capacity must be taken into account on the supply side of 
technology if it cannot be addressed as a demand-side constraint that can be relaxed. Technology 
must be kept relatively simple to use. An example is SwarnaSub1 that requires the same 
agronomic practices as the widely used Swarna rice variety. Another is the leaf color chart to 
adjust the quantity and timing of fertilizer applications. 
 
It is thus possible that available technology is not adapted to the circumstances and demands of a 
majority of farmers. Either it has to be adapted to the lack of key complementary factors, or the 
complementary factors have to be jointly delivered as a technological package. Unless this is 
done, lack of technological upgrading for a majority of farmers may not be an adoption issue 
(i.e., a constraint that can be directly addressed) but a supply-side issue concerning the 
availability of technologies that are profitable and adoptable by the majority of farmers. Lack of 
investment in Research-and-Development to address the specificity and heterogeneity of Sub-
Saharan conditions noted above adds credibility to this interpretation. This is documented by 
Pardey et al. (2016) who shows that there is both under-investment in agricultural research in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as revealed by an estimated average internal rate of return of 42% for 25 
countries over the 1975-2014 period, well in excess the expected return on public investment, 
and a continuing deterioration of the situation. Goyal and Nash (2016) document a net 
decapitalization of agriculture Research-and-Development capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa over 
the last decade. 
 
Conclusion is that an approach to modernization that seeks to remove constraints on adoption of 
existing technology is essential, but likely to hit a low ceiling due to heterogeneity of conditions, 
lack of complementary factors, and diverse farmers’ objectives and capacity. A complementary 
approach worth exploring is development of inclusive value chains. 
 
5. Lessons from studies addressing inclusive value chains development 
 
An inclusive value chain development approach consists in creating incentives for SHF to 
modernize through their participation in vertically coordinated value chains that provide links to 
markets for products with a profitable effective demand, while at the same time potentially 
offering solutions to market and government failures. The advantage of a value chain approach 
as opposed to a constraints approach is that it does not predetermine the solution to adoption (the 
removal of a particular constraint) but seeks instead broad complementarities in the ways of 
achieving modernization that are specific to the agent in question. Referring to the Byerlee and 
Haggblade (2013) classification reported in Section 2, we include under the category of 
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vertically coordinated value chains, resource providing contracts (contract farming, out-grower 
schemes) and the more complex multi-stakeholder structure.   
 
Which elements are included (credit, technology transfer, input provision, information, training, 
etc.) and the specific structure and institutional form that this vertical coordination will take is 
endogenous, depending on the particular needs of producers, the end-buyers, and the context of 
market failures and institutional deficits. 
 
a. Resource providing contracts 
A key element of modern value chains that can result in SHF modernization is implementation of 
resource-providing (also called interlinked) contracts (Bardhan, 1989). Contracts can take on a 
large variety of forms (Bellemare and Lim, 2018; FARM Foundation, 2018). They can help 
SHFs overcome market failures (in credit, insurance, and inputs) and government failures (in 
information and access to markets). For example, a contract in an out-grower scheme with a 
sugar plantation in Kenya provides index insurance to individual farmers with the premium 
deducted from harvest-time payment for product delivery (Casaburi and Willis, 2018), providing 
a rare case of large take-up of index insurance without subsidies. Quality recognition can be an 
integral part of contracts, for instance inducing higher quality of cocoa production in Sierra 
Leone (Casaburi and Reed, 2017).  
 
Resource-providing contracts are however typically difficult to put into place, implement, and 
enforce. Contract terms (demanding phytosanitary and quality norms; technological 
specifications in production) can be difficult for SHFs to respect.  This applies to domestic 
markets that supply supermarkets and rich urban consumers who demand quality standards that 
approximate international norms. Monopsony power of contracting agents (agribusiness, agro-
exporters, supermarkets) can lead to hold-up practices with defaults or delays in payments and 
lower prices on deliveries. Side-selling by SHFs when the contract price is inferior to the local 
market price at harvest time can also undermine the enforcement and credibility of contracts. 
And principal-agent relationships facilitate appropriation by the lead agent, typically the 
commercial partner, of the net social gains created by the contract thus limiting its potential for 
poverty reduction if there has been no improvement in farmers’ bargaining power over surplus. 
Despite these difficulties, empirical studies tend to show positive benefits of these contracts for 
SHFs under the form of technology adoption, agricultural transformation, and income and 
employment gains (see for example the study by Dihel et al., 2018, for Ghana, Kenya, and 
Zambia). Most available impact studies are however recognized to suffer from selection biases 
and external validity issues (Bellemare, 2015). 
 
b. Vertical coordination in value chains 
Other institutions are frequently necessary to complement or strengthen a simple contract.  For 
example hold-up risk by the buyer can be resolved through a commonly accepted external 
certification agent. Saenger et al. (2014) show that providing dairy farmers contracted by a large 
company in Vietnam an independent milk quality assessment induced a 12% increase in input 
use, and a significant corresponding increase in output (quantity of milk fat and total solids), 
ultimately translating into higher welfare for the farmers. What is interesting in this case is that, 
while the company was playing fair with farmers, some of them believed that it was behaving 
opportunistically in rejecting some milk deliveries.  Independent certification can thus benefit 
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both the farmers and the company.  More generally, quality certification can have a major role in 
value chain development where phytosanitary standards and other qualitative aspects of produce 
are important (Dequiedt, 2018). Important is for certification to happen low in the value chain, 
before aggregation of produce makes it impossible to reward individual quality contributions, 
which is particularly challenging when production originates in thousands of very small farmers 
(Bernard et al., 2017; Abate and Bernard, 2018). Where quality can be certified early in the value 
chain, incentives can be created for farmers to invest in quality enhancement, in particular 
through the adoption of technological change (Balineau, 2018). 
 
Beyond the direct contract between (say) a processor and farmers, arrangements may involve a 
separate input provider, or a financial actor that will provide credit to the farmers, possibly 
guaranteed by the processor or the input provider, or a transporter, etc.  These arrangements 
result in value chain models that are quite complex, entailing the need for coordination between 
multiple stakeholders, sometimes referred to as innovation platforms.  
 
As an example, the Bubaare Innovation Platform in Uganda developed since 2008 the sorghum 
value chain for the production of baby food and a traditional beverage in a context where most 
small farmers only produced sorghum for their own consumption.  The platform includes Huntex 
Ltd, a large processor selling to supermarkets that invested in storage (a key element for the 
conservation of the products that could only be afforded with economies of scale) and packages 
and commercializes the products, credit partners that provide financing to farmers and the 
processor, the public agricultural research system that developed new high yielding varieties, 
extensions services that taught farmers improved crop management techniques, local parish 
governments that set the standards for the commercialization of sorghum, and the University of 
Makerere that helped with technology development. This very successful platform registered as a 
cooperative in 2013 and operates without any further donor intervention, solely relying on 
membership fees (Kalibwani and Twebaze, 2015). 
 
A different story emerges from Peru, where a value chain was created to market native potatoes 
produced by SHF to high-income consumers in Lima.  Coordination is assumed by a strong 
intermediary (CAPAC, Cadenas Agricolas Productivas de Calidad) which links farmers to a few 
supermarket groups.  On the supply side, CAPAC coordinates services provided to producers by 
different NGOs, which include contract management, quality control, and delivery to the 
supermarkets.  On the demand side, CAPAC participates in national advocacy, the promotion of 
events, and the creation of labels.  The supermarkets themselves have developed their own 
promotion, including a cooking school and books.  And researchers at the International Potato 
Center have developed improved storage methods (Thiele et al., 2011). 
 
There have been multiple initiatives by governments, private enterprises, development agencies, 
and NGOs to promote the development of similar vertically coordinated value chains. Over the 
last 15 years, the World Bank has spent heavily in value chain development in seven West 
African countries with investments in infrastructure (roads, irrigation, electricity, market 
facilities), support to producer organizations (training, capacity), development of supporting 
services (credit and insurance, technical assistance), and public sector capacity (extension, 
regulation). This has focused on value chains such as mangos, onions, meat, and poultry in 
Burkina Faso, and onions and rice in Senegal (World Bank Agricultural Diversification and 
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Market Development Project for Burkina Faso and Senegal, internal documents). Rigorous 
evaluation of these investments is still not available. 
 
These innovation platforms are to help actors in a value chain communicate and coordinate 
actions to address bottlenecks to value chain development. Swinnen (2018) emphasizes the role 
of identifying appropriate entry points that can consist in financing the leading firm in a value 
chain so it has resources to in turn finance farmers in interlinked contracts, and directly targeting 
constraints to value chain development such as farmer training, PO development, and presence 
of service providers. As revealed by the FARM Foundation (2018) review of contracting in value 
chains in Sub-Saharan Africa, leading private sector enterprises have been important in acting as 
coordinating agents for value chain development. Coordination can thus be achieved at the cost 
of competition, creating an interesting trade-off whereby monopsony power in value chains can 
help facilitate vertical coordination while enhancing value extraction to the benefit of the lead 
agent.  
 
Value chains for low-value domestic staple foods are particularly important for smallholders, but 
more difficult to develop as discipline is harder to achieve due to the large number of producers 
and availability of local buyers facilitating side-selling (Lançon, 2018). Yet, success with value 
chain development for domestic producers is essential if they are to remain competitive with 
imports, and also potentially help the country make headways in substituting for rapidly rising 
imports.  
 
Value chain development does not necessarily come top-down from commercial partners. It can 
also come bottom-up at the initiative of producer organizations. Collion (2018) thus contrasts 
top-down “aggregation schemes” in Morocco where an agroindustry contracts with producers to 
secure the provision of produce with quality specifications, to bottom-up “productive alliances” 
in Latin America where a producer organization develops a business plan that involves 
contracting with a commercial partner in resource-providing contracts. Capacity of the producer 
organization to do this typically comes with technical assistance and subsidies provided by the 
public sector and with the support of international development organizations (World Bank, 
2016). Hence, the inclusive value chain development approach to modernization and 
transformation can come from upstream as well as from downstream agents in the value chain, 
even if the latter tends to dominate occurrences. 
 
c. Inclusive value chains 
With SHF inclusion, value chain development can become not only a powerful instrument for 
modernization but also for rural poverty reduction via profit-making as entrepreneurs and via 
employment benefits as workers in vertically integrated schemes (Van den Broeck, Swinnen, and 
Maertens, 2016).  
 
A value chain development approach to modernization typically builds on the best, starting with 
regions and farmers better endowed and closer to markets. As it gains strength, the value chain 
can gradually include more distant regions and less well-endowed farmers, fulfilling a more 
extensive poverty reduction function. Some of the key conditions for successful inclusion are the 
following:  
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(1) Sufficient asset endowments for SHF under the form of land, capital, health, knowledge and 
skills, and social capital to initiate production for the market and participation in a value chain 
(Devaux, Torero, Donovan, and Horton, 2016). The BRAC graduation model for the rural ultra-
poor thus importantly starts with meeting minimum asset thresholds to engage in agricultural 
entrepreneurship (Banerjee et al., 2015). They typically involve animals, health, and 
management skills. Successful value chain inclusion needs extend this effort at SHF asset 
building beyond the ultra-poor.  
 
(2) Producer organizations with capacities, discipline, and bargaining power to engage in 
contracting with commercial partners in productive alliances, without the risks of side-selling 
and contract defaulting (World Bank, 2016).  
 
(3) Willingness and capacity of commercial partners to contract with SHFs in resource providing 
contracts, or in cooperation with service-providing institutions such as commercial banks and 
technology companies that offer SHFs access to these resources.  
 
(4) Quality recognition sufficiently upstream in the value chain that it creates incentives for SHF 
to certify their goods and engage in quality improvement in their production practices.  
 
(5) Helping SHF identify the comparative advantages they can build upon in developing a value 
chain inclusion strategy and achieving competitiveness. This can often be based on labor-
intensive activities anchored in traditional farming systems and agro-ecological niches, and on 
complementarities between small and large farms in servicing a value chain (Swinnen, 2018).  
 
(6) Insertion of a value chain development effort in a broader rural development strategy 
pursuing agricultural and rural transformations. This includes infrastructure investments to 
connect often remote areas to deep markets where they can be competitive (Schejtman and 
Berdegué, 2004).  
 
As this long list of conditions indicates, value chain inclusion is difficult to achieve and requires 
both commitment by supporting agencies and sustained assistance to achieve results. It also 
requires a good understanding of the market forces that determine supply and demand for any 
particular product and hence the profit to be made in participation to the value chain.  An early 
experiment illustrates the case: The Fair Trade value chain shows a way of providing price and 
other supports to SHF (Balineau, 2018). But the value potentially generated for SHF by Fair 
Trade contracts can easily be eroded by unlimited entry (de Janvry, McIntosh, and Sadoulet, 
2015).  
 
Resource-providing contracts and vertical coordination in value chains can thus be effective 
instruments for modernization. The incentives created by linking farmers to markets and 
overcoming market failures help endogenize technological and institutional responses. This can 
lead to innovations to seize new market opportunities as in INSEAD’s Blue Ocean approach 
rather than competition for market share in already deeply competitive markets (Kim and 
Mauborgue, 2005). Design and implementation of this approach to modernization and 
transformation is still in need of much impact evaluation research. 
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d. Impact evaluation of inclusive value chain development 
 
Assessing the impact of a vertically coordinated value chain on (say) farmers production or 
welfare is particularly challenging.  All impact evaluations proceed from well-defined units 
(composed of producers) that are treated (benefit from the intervention) and corresponding 
counterfactual that did not receive it.  In the case of value chains, the unit of intervention is most 
often either a farmer organization or a community, rather than an individual farmer. Even if not 
all farmers from a community participate in the value chain, this would be by choice, and hence 
non-participating farmers cannot be good counterfactuals to participating farmers.  Any analysis 
will thus compare communities in which the value chain has intervened to communities not 
affected.  This raises some statistical concerns.  The number of communities any such 
intervention can incorporate is limited, simply because of financial and human resource 
constraints. 
   
The second challenge is to find counterfactual communities.  The gold standard for measuring 
the impact of interventions or programs is the randomized control trial.  This would consist on 
defining a priori a set of communities that would equally qualify for participating to the value 
chain and only randomly invite half of them to participate.  Getting an institution or a private 
sector firm to select in this way clients with whom it will do business is often hard.  But getting a 
large number of private and public sector partners to all agree around a scheme that will impose 
on them restrictions on who should and should not be incorporated in the process of value chain 
construction is even more challenging if not impossible.  In addition, the construction of a value 
chain is by essence progressive, and it is in part adjusted to the needs and with the contributions 
of the communities that are incorporated. It is rarely a blue print that is offered to communities.   
 
It is then not surprising that we find almost no rigorous evaluations of value chains.  Those that 
exist proceed with an ex-post evaluation whereby researchers take stock of the communities that 
are included in the value chain and look for similar communities that are not included. Cavatassi 
et al. (2011) provide an interesting example with evaluation of a value chain linking smallholder 
potato farmers in the mountain regions of Ecuador to high-value markets. The authors proceed 
with a very careful matching of communities, including propensity score matching using census 
data, verification by key local organizations and agronomists to determine whether they were 
comparable, and finally verifying that the treated and control communities were not differing 
regarding other interventions.  Their impact evaluation is thus restricted to less that half of the 
treatment communities (18) for which they have a good counterfactual.  The authors then use 
different methods of weighting participants, non-participants, and control farmers. All of them 
show similar results that the value chain has brought a large increase in yield and in gross value 
per hectare, and that these benefits were obtained through both selling a higher percentage and 
quantity of potato harvest and selling at a 30 per cent higher price. Production costs also 
increased but benefits outweigh added costs, suggesting welfare benefits for the farmers.  
 
Impact analysis of contract farming presents somewhat different challenges, but is generally 
easier to do.  Similar to what has been done to evaluate the impact of microfinance institutions, 
one can imagine a large processor extending its scale of operation willing to proceed with a 
randomized scheme, by which it will preselect more units (farmers or villages) than it wants to 
incorporate, or use a phased-in design whereby selected units are randomly assigned to be 
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incorporated in two phases.  Yet, the large literature attempting to measure the impact of contract 
farming on farmer welfare uses observational methods (Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare and 
Bloem, 2018). Most studies use propensity score matching to find counterfactuals to individual 
participating farmers, often within limited samples of non-participating farmers. The validity of 
the method in that context is questionable as identification of treatment effects is based on the 
assumption that selection into participation is fully captured by observable characteristics. Other 
studies try to overcome the challenge of the endogenous choice to participate in contract farming 
by using instrumental variable estimation, but similarly finding an instrument that is 
convincingly correlated with the choice of participating in contract farming and yet uncorrelated 
with the potential benefit of this participation is essentially impossible.  As of yet, the closest to a 
randomized evaluation of getting smallholders access to high value markets through contract 
farming is given by Ashraf et al. (2009).  The authors worked with an NGO that serves as an 
intermediary linking SHF to commercial banks, retail providers of farm inputs, transportation 
services, and exporters. 36 farmer groups selected to participate in the experiment were 
randomized into treatment and control.  The study shows that during the first year of operation, 
the contract increased production of export crops and lowered marketing costs, leading to a 32% 
income gain for new adopters. The experience however fell apart one year into the project, with 
defaulting on their commitments by buyers and farmers.  This experience has little external 
validity for what contract farming by a solid private sector partner could do (Bellemare and 
Bloem, 2018).     
6. Conclusion 
 
With modernization of SHF lagging and its recognized importance for growth, agricultural and 
rural transformations, and poverty reduction in agriculture-based countries, efforts have been 
pursued using both a constraint removal and an inclusive value chain development approach. The 
constraints approach has focused on removing major obstacles to adoption originating in 
liquidity, risk, information, and markets. It has yielded significant benefits, especially in terms of 
designing institutional innovations to overcome constraints to adoption, and work is still in 
progress. Institutional agents such as governments, international and bilateral development 
agencies, NGOs, and donors have a key role to play in implementing the approach. Yet, the 
approach has shown limits with modest aggregate success in technology adoption, calling for a 
complementary approach. A value chain approach that relies on development and inclusion has 
been relatively less explored in spite of potential effectiveness. This approach focuses on 
creating incentives to modernization in inclusive value chains that cater through commercial 
agents to well identified consumer demand. Modernization will typically require technological 
and institutional innovations to meet this demand through the value chain. Private agents such as 
entrepreneurs and corporations, and collective action in producer organizations, have a key role 
to play in designing and implementing contracts and coordination. Important lessons from 
experiences reviewed highlight the roles of asset endowments, producer organizations, 
contracting, and value chain coordination through lead agents and multi-stakeholder platforms. 
Implementation of both approaches to achieve growth and poverty reduction requires increasing 
investment in agriculture for development. 
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Together, these recommendations help define a research agenda to be followed in support of the 
much needed modernization and transformation of agriculture in poor agriculture-based 
countries. For the constraints approach, the agenda focuses on identifying technological and 
institutional innovations to overcome the credit, insurance, information, and market access 
constraints to adoption. For the value chain approach, it focuses on promoting value chain 
development and inclusion with attention to the roles of threshold asset endowments, designing 
and implementing resource-providing contracts, enhancement of PO discipline in contracting, 
technological and institutional innovations for SHF to be competitive in meeting effective 
consumer demand, and achieving coordination in value chains that favors inclusion and a fair 
sharing of value. While considerable experience has been gained in rigorous evaluations of the 
constraint removal approach, conceptual thinking is still needed to achieve a similar level of 
rigor in evaluating the inclusive value chains approach. 
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